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Abstract
In both general equilibrium theory and game theory, the dominant mathematical models rest on a
fully rational solution concept in which every player’s action is a best-response to the actions of the
other players. In both theories there is less agreement on suitable out-of-equilibrium modeling, but one
attractive approach is the level k model in which a level 0 player adopts a very simple response to
current conditions, a level 1 player best-responds to a model in which others take level 0 actions, and
so forth. (This is analogous to k-ply exploration of game trees in AI, and to receding-horizon control
in control theory.) If players have deterministic mental models with this kind of finite-level response,
there is obviously no way their mental models can all be consistent. Nevertheless, there is experimental
evidence that people act this way in many situations, motivating the question of what the dynamics of
such interactions lead to.
We address this question in the setting of Fisher Markets with constant elasticities of substitution
(CES) utilities, in the weak gross substitutes (WGS) regime. We show that despite the inconsistency
of the mental models, and even if players’ models change arbitrarily from round to round, the market
converges to its unique equilibrium. (We show this for both synchronous and asynchronous discrete-time
updates.) Moreover, the result is computationally feasible in the sense that the convergence rate is linear,
i.e., the distance to equilibrium decays exponentially fast. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
result that demonstrates, in Fisher markets, convergence at any rate for dynamics driven by a plausible
model of seller incentives. Even for the simple case of (level 0) best-response dynamics, where we observe
that convergence at some rate can be derived from recent results in convex optimization, our result is
the first to demonstrate a linear rate of convergence.
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1 Introduction
Motivation This paper deals with the question of why, and whether, a model of interacting strategic
agents converges to equilibrium. We study this question in Fisher markets, under conditions where market
equilibrium is unique and finding it is computationally tractable. Over the years and in particular recently,
several game and market dynamics have been studied, but they fall short of modeling the key scenario which
we attempt to address.
In particular, in game theory, dynamics are studied in the context of repeated games. Extensive form
solution concepts such as subgame perfect or sequential equilibria assume that the agents unravel the entire
evolution of the game and choose in advance their entire play optimally. This is likely to be computationally
infeasible (e.g. [8], but see in contrast [25]). The strategies are unrealistically prescient of the distant future,
contradicting experience and hindering on-the-fly adaptation to unexpected changes. Just as importantly,
since the entire play is determined a-priori and an equilibrium is played throughout, such concepts do not
capture out-of-equilibrium behavior (that may lead to equilibrium over time), so they are in fact a static
notion.
Walrasian taˆtonnement, and more generally game theoretic learning dynamics (a.k.a. no-regret dynam-
ics), are an alternative approach. These are truly dynamic, out-of-equilibrium frameworks, that can be
shown in many cases to converge to an attractive solution concept. However, the reactions of the agents
have to be damped carefully for a desirable outcome to materialize; such reactions lack strategic justification
(see [7] and the references therein, e.g., [26]).
Closer to our work, various formulations of bounded rationality have provided a rich basis for progress in
game theory and, over the last two decades, in its algorithmic aspects. The most basic approach in this vein
is best-response dynamics. Agents play myopically an optimal move at each round, assuming that the other
agents will not deviate from their existing strategy. 1 A strategy which is somewhat more sophisticated than
best-response is limited-depth exploration of an extensive form game tree. This is an approach to complex
games that was developed in the early days of AI (the exploration depth is sometimes called the ply of a
search). Essentially the same concept is known in control theory as receding-horizon control. This is in
contrast with the full-rationality approach underlying solution concepts such as the aforementioned subgame
perfect or sequential equilibria.
In game theory, the idea that people compete by pursuing limited-lookahead situational analysis goes
under the rubric of the level k model, initiated by [43, 44] and [37]; related ideas are also known as cognitive
hierarchy, higher-order rationality, and bounded depth of reasoning. The idea has been subjected to many
experimental tests—see [28, 15, 16, 9, 14, 19, 18]—and has emerged with considerable support. For recent
theoretical work on the model see [45, 30, 20, 24]; for a survey see [17].
In view of the above, it is important to study the dynamics and stability of markets composed of agents
each of whom performs some limited lookahead and plays optimally against that forecast. Limited lookahead
means that each agent j has a mental model of each other agent k, where k looks ahead some constant number
of steps, and based on that chooses an optimal action (according to j’s perception). Based on this model,
j chooses a move that is optimal conditional on those other imagined actions. The paradox of endless self-
reference is obvious here, and is precisely the point of the exercise: such a model does not make sense for
infinitely-intelligent agents who possess perfect common knowledge of the properties of the market. But
such agents do not exist. Instead, the model is consistent with experience that markets are composed of
many agents who, despite having limited ability to predict the actions of others, do their best to make such
a prediction and then respond optimally to their own prediction. This is a very different approach to agent
choice than the “solution concept” notion on which game theory rests: Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria,
the core, and so forth. In particular, one difference is that in contrast with full rationality, in the limited
lookahead case the beliefs of the agents are not necessarily consistent with each other and with reality. In
fact, they may even be self-inconsistent across time steps. From a purely mathematical perspective these
inconsistencies might appear to be a fatal flaw. We hold differently, that this is part of the challenge of
1The situations where best-response is known to lead to an attractive outcome are tightly connected to the concept of
potential games. See [35, 4, 12]. For a damped version, logit dynamics, see [3]. For a general discussion of best-response and
the related fictitious play dynamics, see [42].
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modeling out-of-equilibrium strategic play. The market is out of equilibrium because players do not have
perfect models of each other, or because they are uncertain about exogenous factors a few steps into the
future. We further hold that the predictive power in experiments of the level k model is ample reason to study
its dynamics. That is what we do here (and for a more general notion of best-response with lookahead).
Our results This paper is devoted to studying the dynamics and stability of markets where the agents
model their peers as using limited lookahead. We focus on one of the best-understood cases of general
equilibrium theory, namely Fisher markets that consist of sellers of goods and buyers endowed with budgets.
In fact, we develop a general framework that shows convergence of dynamics based on limited lookahead,
only requiring certain abstract conditions on the updates of the players. A concrete special case is a Fisher
market in which the buyers generate demand due to utilities that exhibit constant elasticity of substitution
(CES), in the weak gross substitutes (WGS) regime. (Rigorous definitions await Sections 2 and 3.) CES
utilities were chosen because this setting is very well understood in the context of discrete-time taˆtonnement
(see [10]), and this gives us some comparative perspective. The restriction to WGS was imposed because
otherwise even staying at a market equilibrium cannot be reasoned by individual sellers best-responding to
the equilibrium.
Our dynamic model focuses on the sellers. Each seller controls and sets the price of a unique single good.
The buyers are assumed to react instantly and myopically to current prices by adjusting their demand to
optimize their utilities subject to their budgets. This assumption can be justified, for instance, by assuming
that there is a large number of buyers, each contributing negligibly to the demand. Each seller is assumed to
form a belief on the next move of each of the other sellers, and then to choose a price that optimizes its own
profit based on this belief. We analyze a rather general belief formation process that includes, as a special
case, beliefs based on assuming that the other sellers use limited lookahead. We assume neither consistency
among the beliefs formed by different sellers, nor consistency among the beliefs formed by the same seller at
different times. This includes as a special case, but is considerably more general than, level k choices. See
Figure 1. We refer to dynamics of this sort as best-response with lookahead (abbreviated BRL) dynamics.
BRL dynamics, and even the special case of best-response (with no lookahead), can be quite volatile,
as compared with usual taˆtonnement processes, because of the absence of any damping factor. Despite the
volatility and the potential inconsistency of beliefs, we show that regardless of the specifics of the beliefs
formed by the agents, the dynamic converges rapidly to market equilibrium. More precisely, we analyze
two versions of our process. In the synchronous case, all sellers update prices simultaneously. In this case,
the distance to equilibrium decays exponentially in the number of steps (a.k.a. linear convergence). In the
asynchronous case, at each time step only a subset of one or more sellers update prices. In this case, the
distance to equilibrium decays exponentially in the number of epochs, where an epoch consists of time
intervals in which all the sellers update at least once.
To the best of our knowledge, convergence, and definitely linear convergence, was not previously demon-
strated even for the simplest version of our process, namely best-response. Our proof of convergence relies on
showing that in a judiciously chosen metric (the Thompson metric), the BRL dynamics form a contraction
map.
Related work General equilibrium theory is the principal framework through which economists under-
stand the operation of markets (see [33, 36]). It is one of the great achievements of economic theory in
general and of mathematical modeling of microeconomics in particular. The theory is largely responsible
for the governing paradigm that a state of equilibrium which the participants in economic exchange do not
wish to deviate from individually is under mild conditions attainable [2, 32] (see also [27]), and that this is
normally roughly the state of the economy. This is a paradigm that can be observed “in the field” and also
reproduced in controlled experiments, and it lends credence and concreteness to the famed invisible hand
metaphor.
In contrast, there is less agreement on an effective explanation as to why markets tend to reach a state of
equilibrium. This is a question about the stability or out-of-equilibrium behavior of markets. It is important
because in reality economic conditions are not static. They vary continually and suffer serious “shocks” occa-
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Figure 1: Various collective mental models for one round of play in a 3-seller market. A leaf (level 1) denotes
best-response dynamics. In level 2 dynamics everyone best-responds to everyone’s best-response to current
prices. Players’ beliefs can be far more complex. In the last example C plays by a level 2 model while A and
B have more elaborate mental models.
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sionally. So justifying an equilibrium outcome requires a dynamic that moves an economy at disequilibrium
back to a new equilibrium, and does so sufficiently quickly that the periods of disequilibrium due to fluctua-
tions are relatively negligible (see [21]). The classical mechanism proposed to explain general equilibrium is
Walrasian taˆtonnement [47], a process that reacts to excess demand by raising the price and to excess supply
by reducing the price. Variants of taˆtonnement are known to converge to equilibrium, at least in some classes
of markets including those we consider here (e.g. [41, 1, 10]). However, the classical view of taˆtonnement
posits the existence of an imaginary “auctioneer” who controls the process by announcing prices. Recent
work on the convergence of discrete-time taˆtonnement in Fisher markets attempts to present it as an in-
market process in the context of the so-called ongoing markets [13, 11]. However, even this attempt requires
a somewhat careful choice of the magnitude of the price adjustment which is not motivated by any agent
considerations (aside from a common inexplicable passion to equilibrate the economy). Thus, the difficulty
is in formulating a theory of out-of-equilibrium behavior that makes sense in terms of the incentives of the
participants.
In is well-known that market equilibria in Fisher markets with CES utilities can be expressed as solutions
to a convex program, first proposed by Eisenberg and Gale (see [29]). We observe that best-response dynamics
(i.e., the simplest example of our setting) can, in fact, be explained as a specific implementation of coordinate
descent (in the dual program). The convergence of coordinate descent was established in [46], without bounds
on the rate. Recently, [40] established a sublinear convergence rate (the distance to the optimum decays
linearly with the number of iterations), if the objective function satisfies some conditions. We note that the
objective function of the dual Eisenberg-Gale program satisfies these conditions. Our general result shows a
linear convergence rate (the distance to equilibrium decays exponentially in the number of iterations), and
this holds in particular in the case of best-response. To the best of our knowledge, this is not implied by
previous results.
Two recent papers consider market dynamics under strategic behavior. Both bound the fraction of
optimal welfare that is guaranteed. In [5], strategic buyers play a Nash (or Bayesian) equilibrium in a market
in which the sellers’ prices are determined by Walrasian taˆtonnement; note that here the taˆtonnement is part
of the mechanism defining the game, rather than the agents’ strategies. In [6], sellers engage in best-response
dynamics. In this setting the market does not actually have an equilibrium, but a fraction of the optimal
welfare can be extracted by the dynamic. In both papers the market model is quite different from ours.
In the game theory setting (as opposed to markets), best-response dynamics have been studied extensively
in recent years, mostly concerning bounds on the quality of the play and conditions that imply or prevent
convergence to a Nash equilibrium [34, 39, 23, 22]. The paper [38] investigates conditions under which
best-response is a fully rational strategy.
2 Preliminaries
The market model We consider a Fisher market with n perfectly divisible goods and m buyers. Each
good is initially owned by a unique seller that controls its price, and its quantity is scaled to 1. The utility
of that seller is the price times min{demand, 1}. The buyers respond instantly and myopically to price
changes. Thus their role in the process is to specify in a convenient way the demands for the goods at any
given assignment of prices to those goods. This is done as follows. Each buyer i is endowed with a positive
budget bi and a utility function ui over baskets of goods x.
For a price vector p, we write p > 0 to indicate that all the prices are strictly positive. Similarly for price
vectors p, q, we write p > q (resp. p ≥ q) if pj > qj (resp. pj ≥ qj) for all j.
Given a price vector p > 0, the demands for the goods are determined as follows. Every buyer i chooses
xi to optimize the utility function ui(x), subject to the budget constaint∑
j
pjxij ≤ bi. (1)
We denote the utility maximizing allocations for prices p by x(p). The demand for each good j at prices p
is
∑
i xij(p).
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Price updates In general, a market dynamic is based on an update rule for each seller that determines
its new price. The rules can then by applied synchronously to all sellers, or serially to one seller at a time in
some order. We will discuss these variations later. For now, we focus on the update rules. An update rule
can take into account some or all of the dynamic history leading to the current state (including the current
prices), and also some internal state of the seller that takes other factors into account. We are interested
in update rules that depend on the current price vector (and any other parameters), and are monotone,
sub-homogeneous, price-bounded, and positive with respect to that price vector. To define these properties
formally, let F ιj (p) denote the new price of seller j, given current prices p, and ι encoding all the other
relevant parameters (if any). Then,
Definition 1 (monotonicity, sub-homogeneity, price-boundedness, positivity). We say that:
• F ιj is monotone if for all pairs of price vectors p, q such that p ≥ q coordinate-wise, F ιj (p) ≥ F ιj (q);
• F ιj is sub-homogeneous if for all price vectors p and for all λ ∈ (0, 1), F ιj (λp) ≥ λF ιj (p), also F ιj is
strictly sub-homogeneous iff the inequality is strict for all p > 0;
• F ιj is [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded if for all price vectors p ∈ [pmin, pmax]n, F ιj (p) ∈ [pmin, pmax].
• F ιj is positive if pmin > 0.
For a price vector p and price updates Fj for all j ∈ [n], we denote by F (p) the price vector derived
by applying the updates simultaneously to p. We say that F has a property (e.g., is monotone) if all of its
components have this property.
Lemma 2. Fix pmin, pmax, and suppose that F : [pmin, pmax]
n → [pmin, pmax]n and g : [pmin, pmax]n →
[pmin, pmax] are both monotone, sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-price bounded updates. Then so is g ◦ F .
Moreover, if g is strictly sub-homogeneous and F is positive, then g ◦ F is also strictly sub-homogeneous.
Proof. By the monotonicity of F , if p ≥ q coordinate-wise, then F (p) ≥ F (q) coordinate-wise. Therefore,
by the monotonicity of g, we have that g(F (p)) ≥ g(F (q)). Next, g(F (λp)) ≥ g(λF (p)) ≥ λg(F (p)), where
the first inequality uses the monotonicity of g and the sub-homogeneity of F , and the second inequality uses
the sub-homogeneity of g. Moreover, if g is strictly sub-homogeneous, then the second inequality is strict
if F (p) > 0, which is implied when p > 0 by the assumption that F is positive. Finally, using the price
boundedness of both F and g, if p ∈ [pmin, pmax]n, then F (p) ∈ [pmin, pmax]n, so g(F (p)) ∈ [pmin, pmax]. 
Belief formation We consider dynamics where each seller updates its price according to a belief of which
prices the other sellers will set in the next step. The beliefs that are formed by different sellers or by the
same seller at different times need not be consistent. We show that despite this inconsistency, the dynamics
still converge to equilibrium, assuming that the ingredients satisfy certain properties. In general, a belief pi
is a function that maps a pair (p, ι), where p is the current price vector and ι is the internal state of the
seller, to the believed price vector.
We now discuss a rather general framework of forming such beliefs. This framework in particular enables
the sellers to form level k best-response beliefs, and more general best-response beliefs. We haven’t yet
formally defined “best-response”, but for now it suffices to assume that there is at our disposal a price
update called best-response. The details of best-response update are discussed in Section 3. Also, in order
to get some intuition on the following explanation, it might be useful to visualize the trees in the bottom
example in Figure 1.
We explain how seller j forms a belief pi = piι. The idea is that seller j has, for every other seller k, a
mental model ιk of the update rule that k employs, and pik is simply the price that ιk generates. Of course,
in order to form ιk, seller j must also imagine seller k’s mental models for all k
′ 6= k (this includes j). So,
we define inductively a set of possible mental models of seller updates, and seller j simply picks each ιk
from this set. The set M of mental models consists of levels; M = ⋃∞s=0Ms. They are defined inductively
as follows. The base case, level 0, is M0 that contains a single model of staying put at the current price.
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Inductively, a mental model or belief ι for player j is formed by selecting any ιk1 , . . . , ιkn (but there is no
ιj); the price update defined by this mental model is player j’s best-response to the prices generated by all
the other players if they act with the assigned mental models on the basis of the current prices. The level of
ι is one more than the maximum level of ιk1 , . . . , ιkn .
We note in passing that beliefs thus formed, implicitly model sellers with epistemic assumptions that
they are a bit smarter than their peers—every seller j updates with one extra step beyond the maximum
number of steps used in j’s mental model ι. Of course, such beliefs cannot possibly be consistent among
sellers (unless they are children in Lake Wobegon).
The following lemma states the desired properties of belief formation.
Lemma 3. Fix pmin, pmax. Suppose that best-response is monotone, sub-homogeneous, [pmin, pmax]-price
bounded and positive. Further suppose that seller j uses a monotone, strictly sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-
price bounded update function Fj, and given current prices p, updates to F
ι
j (p) = Fj(pi
ι(p)). Then, F ιj is
monotone, strictly sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded.
2
Proof. Since staying put at the current price is monotone, sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded,
a simple induction on s using Lemma 2 shows that piι is monotone, sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-price-
bounded. One more application of Lemma 2 gives the desired properties of F ιj . 
3 Concrete case of CES-WGS markets
CES utilities These are utility functions of the form
ui(x) =
∑
j
(cijxij)
ρ
 1ρ , (2)
where xij denotes the quantity of good j that buyer i purchased. The parameter ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) is
assumed, for simplicity, to be uniform for all buyers. These utility functions are known as constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) utilities. When ρ ∈ (0, 1), the goods are weak gross substitutes (WGS). In the case of
ρ ∈ (−∞, 0), the goods are complementary.
For CES utilities, the utility-maximizing allocations are given explicitly by the equation
xij(p) =
bi
pj
· (cij/pj)
∑
k (cik/pk)
 , (3)
where  = ρ1−ρ . Notice that if ρ ∈ (0, 1), then  ∈ (0,∞). In this case, the demand satisfies the following
property.3
Lemma 4. Let the utilities be CES in the WGS regime. Fix a price vector p and a good j. Consider all
price vectors p′ with the property that for all k 6= j, p′k = pk. Among these price vectors, the total desired
spending
∑
i xij(p
′) · p′j on good j is monotonically decreasing in p′j.
Proof. Using Equation (3), the total desired spending on j is given by the equation
∑
i
xij(p
′) · p′j =
∑
i
bi ·
(
cij/p
′
j
)(
cij/p′j
)
+
∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)
 .
2In fact, the conclusion of Lemma 3 holds even for beliefs that are formed by a set of monotone, sub-homogeneous, price
bounded, and positive price updates, instead of a single such update. In the tree view of belief formation, such a set is used by
choosing, for each node of the tree, an arbitrary member of the set as the modeled action. To simplify the exposition, we do
not elaborate on this generalization.
3The proof of this fundamental fact is rather trivial, but we are not aware of a good reference. Notice that the same proof
shows that if the CES utilities are complementary ( < 0), then the spending on good j is monotonically increasing in p′j . This
is the motivation for considering only WGS utilities.
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The derivative of the right-hand side with respect to p′j is
− ·
∑
i
bi
p′j
·
( (cij/p′j)(
cij/p′j
)
+
∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)

)
−
( (
cij/p
′
j
)(
cij/p′j
)
+
∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)

)2 .
This expression is negative, because
(cij/p′j)

(cij/p′j)

+
∑
k 6=j(cik/pk)
 < 1. 
Corollary 5. Using the same notation as in Lemma 4, the profit min {∑i xij(p′), 1} · p′j of seller j is
maximized at the price p′j for which the demand
∑
i xij(p
′) equals 1.
Proof. By Equation (3), the demand
∑
i xij(p
′) decreases monotonically in p′j . By Lemma 4, also the desired
spending decreases monotonically in p′j . Therefore, the profit is maximized at the lowest price for which
the demand is at most 1 (lowering the price further will not increase the quantity sold beyond the initial
endowment). 
Best-response updates In standard best-response dynamics, each seller updates its price to maximize its
revenue given the current prices of the other players. In the particular setting of demand that is generated
by CES utilities in the WGS regime, a seller j maximizes profit by setting the price pj to clear the market
for good j (by Corollary 5). I.e., if the current price vector is p, the seller chooses a new price Fj(p) for good
j, so that
m∑
i=1
xij(p
′) = 1, (4)
where p′j = Fj(p), and for all k 6= j, p′k = pk. More explicitly, seller j best-responds by solving for p′j the
equation
p′j =
m∑
i=1
bi ·
(
cij/p
′
j
)∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)

+
(
cij/p′j
) . (5)
Notice that the right-hand side of Equation (5) is simply the total spending of all the buyers on good j when
this good’s price is p′j and the other prices are given by the vector p.
Lemma 6. For CES utilities with ρ ∈ (0, 1), best-response updates Fj are monotone, strictly sub-homogeneous,
positive, and [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded for some pmin = pmin(b, c, ρ) > 0 and pmax = pmax(b).
Proof. We begin with monotonicity. Consider two price vectors p ≥ q, and let p′j = Fj(p) and let q′j = Fj(q).
Consider the function
g(α, p) = α−
m∑
i=1
bi · (cij/α)
∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)

+ (cij/α)
 .
In other words, g(α, p) is α minus the total spending of all the buyers on good j when the price of good
j is α and the other prices are given by the vector p (thus, g(α, p) = 0 iff α = Fj(p)). We have that
g(p′j , p) = g(q
′
j , q) = 0. Notice that for any k, increasing pk decreases g(α, p). On the other hand, g(α, p)
increases as α increases (an immediate consequence of Lemma 4). Thus, g(p′j , q) ≥ 0. If g(α, q) = 0 ≤ g(p′j , q),
then it must be that α ≤ p′j . Thus q′j ≤ p′j .
Next we prove sub-homogeneity. Let p′j = Fj(p). Then,
g(λp′j , λp) = λp
′
j −
∑
i
bi ·
(
cij/p
′
j
)∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)

+
(
cij/p′j
) = g(p′j , p)− (1− λ) · p′j ≤ 0.
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Thus, by the monotonicity of g in α, if g(α, λp) = 0 ≥ g(λp′j , λp), then α ≥ λp′j . Finally, if all the entries of
p are strictly positive, then p′j > 0, so g(λp
′
j , λp) < 0 and therefore g(α, λp) = 0 implies that α > λp
′
j .
Finally, we show price-boundedness. As before, let p′j = Fj(p). For the upper bound, notice that if
pj >
∑
i bi then the total demand for good j must be less than 1, regardless of the other prices. So we can
simply set pmax =
∑
i bi. For the lower bound, consider any buyer i with cij > 0. Consider the situation
where all the entries of p are at least pmin, and the price of good j is qj < pmin (we will specify pmin shortly).
The demand that i has for good j in this situation is
bi
qj
· (cij/qj)
∑
k 6=j (cik/pk)

+ (cij/qj)
 >
Cij
pmin
,
where Cij =
bi·cij∑
k c

ik
. Set pmin = min{1/Cij : cij > 0}. The demand that i alone generates for good j is more
than 1, so qj 6= p′j . Thus, we must have p′j ≥ pmin. Given the value of pmin, this shows also positivity. 
Best-response with lookahead (BRL) beliefs In these dynamics, each seller best-responds to a belief
(a mental model) of what the other sellers plan to do. We already discussed a general framework of forming
beliefs. Now that we have defined best-response updates, Lemma 3 immediately implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 7. Let pmin, pmax be as stipulated by Lemma 6. Suppose that a price update Fj that seller j
applies to a price vector p ∈ [pmin, pmax]n is a best-response (as defined in this section) to a belief pi = piι(p)
that was generated by a mental model ι ∈Mn−1 (using best-response as defined in this section). Then Fj is
monotone, strictly sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded.
4 Synchronous Dynamics
Our main tool for proving convergence of BRL dynamics is the following theorem. Before stating the theorem,
we require a definition.
Definition 8. Consider the set Rn++ ⊂ Rn of vectors with strictly positive coordinates. The Thompson
metric d on Rn++ (see [31]) is defined as follows. For x, y ∈ Rn++,
d(x, y) = max
i
∣∣∣∣log xiyi
∣∣∣∣ = ‖ log x− log y‖∞,
where log x means the vector of logarithms of the entries of x.
The following Lemma shows how this metric is related to the standard `2 and `∞ metrics.
Lemma 9. Let pa, pb ∈ [pmin, pmax]n with 0 < pmin < pmax. Then, we have
∥∥pa − pb∥∥∞ ≤ (pmax)2pmin d (pa, pb)∥∥pa − pb∥∥
2
≤ √n (pmax)
2
pmin
d
(
pa, pb
)
Proof. For each i, we have∣∣pai − pbi ∣∣ ≤ pmax ∣∣∣∣paipbi − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ pmax (exp (d (pa, pb))− 1)
The function f (t) = exp (t)−1−κt is non-increasing on the interval [0, log (κ)] for every κ > 0 and evaluates
to 0 at t = 0. Hence exp (t)− 1 ≤ κt for every t ∈ [0, log (κ)].
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Since d
(
pa, pb
) ≤ log (pmaxpmin ), we can choose κ = pmaxpmin and conclude that
exp
(
d
(
pa, pb
))− 1 ≤ pmax
pmin
d
(
pa, pb
)
Thus, we have ∣∣pai − pbi ∣∣ ≤ pmax pmaxpmin d (pa, pb) = (pmax)
2
pmin
d
(
pa, pb
)
Since the bound holds for each i, it holds for the ∞ norm as well. The 2-norm bound simply uses the fact
that the 2 norm is at most
√
n times the infinity norm. 
Theorem 10. Let 0 < pmin ≤ pmax < ∞. If F : [pmin, pmax]n → [pmin, pmax]n is monotone and strictly
sub-homogeneous, then it is a contraction with respect to the Thompson metric d. Also, if we require merely
sub-homogeneity, rather than strict sub-homogeneity, then F is non-expanding with respect to d.
Proof. By assumption F is [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded. Fix p, q ∈ [pmin, pmax]n. Let η = ed(p,q). Then, we
have p ≥ 1η · q and q ≥ 1η · p. We get that
F (p) ≥ F
(
1
η
· q
)
>
1
η
· F (q),
where the first inequality uses monotonicity and the second inequality uses strict sub-homogeneity. Similarly,
F (q) >
1
η
· F (p).
Thus, d(F (p), F (q)) < log η = d(p, q) for all p, q ∈ [pmin, pmax]n. Define
h(ξ) = sup{d(F (p), F (q))− ξ · d(p, q) : p, q ∈ [pmin, pmax]n}.
Since [pmin, pmax]
n is a compact set, h(1) < 0. As h is continuous, there exists ξ ∈ (0, 1) such that h(ξ) < 0.
Thus, F is a contraction mapping with a contraction constant ξ < 1. Finally, if we replace strict sub-
homogeneity by sub-homogeneity, then all the strict inequalities above become weak inequalities, so we get
that d(F (p), F (q)) ≤ d(p, q), as stipulated. 
By Lemma 6, we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 11. An update that consists of all sellers best-responding to the current price p is a contraction.
We denote its contraction constant by ξbr < 1.
We say that a set F of price vector updates is contracting if all its elements are contractions and there is
a uniform upper bound < 1 on the contraction constants. We have the following corollary of Theorem 10.
Corollary 12. Let F be a set of price vector updates where each F ∈ F is generated by all the sellers forming
beliefs that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3, then best-responding to those beliefs. Then, F is contracting,
with uniform bound ≤ ξbr.
Proof. Clearly, combining Lemmas 3 and 6 with Theorem 10 proves that every F ∈ F is a contraction. So
in order to complete the proof, we need to show that the contraction constant is at most ξbr. Let Bj denote
the best-response price update of seller j. Notice that by the definition of ξbr, for every p, q ∈ [pmin, pmax]n,
p 6= q, and for every i, j ∈ [n],
| log(Bj(p)/Bj(q))|
| log(pi/qi)| ≤ ξbr.
9
Let pij denote the belief (a mapping between price vectors) that is used by j in the update Fj . I.e.,
Fj(p) = Bj(pi
j(p)). Notice that by our assumptions on pij and Theorem 10, pij is non-expanding. In
particular, for every p, q ∈ [pmin, pmax]n, p 6= q, and for every i, k ∈ [n],
| log(pijk(p)/pijk(q))|
| log(pi/qi)| ≤ 1.
Thus, we have that for every p, q ∈ [pmin, pmax]n, p 6= q, and for every i, j, k ∈ [n],
| log(Fj(p)/Fj(q))|
| log(pi/qi)| =
| log(Bj(pij(p))/Bj(pij(q)))|
| log(pijk(p)/pijk(q))|
· | log(pi
j
k(p)/pi
j
k(q))|
| log(pi/qi)| ≤ ξbr · 1 = ξbr,
which completes the proof. 
We need an extra property to guarantee convergence to equilibrium.
Definition 13 (local stability). We say that a set of price vector updates F is stable if the following holds
for every F ∈ F : If p∗ is a vector of equilibrium prices, then F (p∗) = p∗.
Our main result is the following convergence theorem.
Theorem 14. Fix pmin, pmax. Let F be a contracting and stable set of price vector updates, where all
F ∈ F are monotone, strictly sub-homogeneous, and [pmin, pmax]-price-bounded. Consider the dynamic
pt+1 = F t(pt), where the choice of F t ∈ F is arbitrary.4 Then, with initial price vector p0 ∈ [pmin, pmax]n,
the dynamic converges to an equilibrium point (which must be unique in this case). Moreover, the rate of
convergence is linear (i.e., the distance to equilibrium decays exponentially fast in the number of time steps).
Proof. Let d be the Thompson metric on [pmin, pmax]
n. Consider an equilibrium point p∗. By the stability
of F , for all t, F t(p∗) = p∗. By the fact that F is contracting, there exists ξmax < 1 such that for all t, F t
is a ξmax-contraction. Therefore,
d(pt+1, p∗) = d(F t(pt), F t(p∗)) ≤ ξmax · d(pt, p∗).
Inductively, for every T ≥ 0,
d(pT , p∗) ≤ (ξmax)T d(p0, p∗).
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 15. If the buyer utilities are CES with ρ > 0, then synchronous best-response dynamics, as well
as BRL dynamics that satisfy the conditions of Corollary 7, both converge to equilibrium at a linear rate.
Corollary 16. Let F satisfy the assumptions of theorem 14. Let p∗ denote the vector of equilibrium prices
and p0 the initial price vector. After T steps of synchronous price updates, let pT denote the resulting price
vector. Then,
‖pT − p∗‖∞ = maxi |pi − p
∗
i | ≤
(pmax)
2
pmin
d
(
p0, p∗
)
(ζmax)
T
‖pT − p∗‖2 ≤
√
n
(pmax)
2
pmin
d
(
p0, p∗
)
(ζmax)
T
Proof. Apply lemma 9 to theorem 14. 
4In particular, if F is a product set, then for all j, F tj can be chosen arbitrarily by seller j. Also, the choices can depend on
the entire history of the process, including, but not limited to, the current prices.
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5 Asynchronous Dynamics
We consider dynamics where each seller updates its price at its own varying rate. Thus, at any given time,
only a subset of the sellers update their price. Adopting the notation from the previous section, we can
formally define the dynamic by allowing some, but not all, of the coordinates of the price vector updates F t
to be the identity map. The other coordinates are required to satisfy the same conditions that are stated in
Theorem 14. We further require that no seller stays put with no update forever. Thus we can partition the
time line into epochs. An epoch ends when all the prices are updated at least once, and a new epoch begins
in the next time step.
Theorem 17. Under the assumptions stated above, the dynamic, starting at initial state p0 ∈ [pmin, pmax]n,
converges to the unique equilibrium point. The rate of convergence, measured by the number of epochs, is
linear, i.e., the distance to equilibrium decays exponentially fast in the number of epochs.
Proof. In an epoch, we can think of the last update of each seller as being applied to the price vector in
the beginning of the epoch, and based on a belief that takes into account all the previous updates in the
epoch. So replace the asynchronous process by a synchronous process where time steps are epochs and price
updates map the prices in the beginning of an epoch to the prices at the end of an epoch. The claim follows
by applying Lemma 3 and Theorem 14. 
Corollary 18. If the buyer utilities are CES with ρ > 0, then asynchronous best-response dynamics, as well
as asynchronous BRL dynamics, both converge to equilibrium at a linear rate, when measured against the
number of epochs. By lemma 9, the linear convergence holds in the Thompson metric d, the `2 and the `∞
metrics.
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